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NINTH CIRCUIT RULES THAT DISCLAIMER STATES
LACK JURISDICTION OVER INDIAN WATER RIGHTS
UNDER THE McCARRAN AMENDMENT
WATER LAW-JURISDICTION: The Ninth Circuit holds that Arizona's and Montana's enabling acts and constitutional jurisdictional
disclaimer provisions over Indian lands prevent them from asserting
jurisdiction over federally recognized Indian tribes under the McCarran Amendment for purposes of adjudicating Indian water rights.
San CarlosApache Tribe v. Arizona, 668 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3217 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1982) (No. 81-2147)
and Northern Cheyenne Tribe of the Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation v. Adsit, 668 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51
U.S.L.W. 3218 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1982) (No. 81-2188).

INTRODUCTION
Eleven states disclaim jurisdiction over Indian tribes and Indian lands.'
Those states include their enabling act disclaimer provisions verbatim in
their constitutions. Although the specific language of each enabling act
differs, Arizona's enabling act disclaimer provision is representative of
many of the other western states' provisions:
Second. That the people inhabiting said proposed State do agree and
declare that they forever disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated and ungranted public lands lying within the boundaries thereof
and to all lands lying within said boundaries owned or held by any
Indian or Indian tribes, the right or title to which shall have been
acquired through or from the United States or any prior sovereignty,
and that until the title of such Indian or Indian tribes shall have
been extinguished the same shall be and remain subject to the disposition and under the absolute jurisdictionand control of the Congress of the United States; (emphasis supplied.) 2
Consequently, none of the disclaimer states has authority to assert jurisdiction over Indian lands within its borders, absent a specific congressional grant of such jurisdiction. 3 Because Indian lands, like all reserved
federal lands, have implied reservations of water appurtenant to the land, 4
organic law disclaimer provisions may prohibit states from determining
water rights on Indian lands. Congress has granted all states criminal and
1. Those eleven states are Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, Washington and Wyoming.
2. Arizona Enabling Act; ch. 310, 36 Stat. 568-69 (1910).
3. For example, the following statutes which grant states jurisdiction over Indian lands within
their boundaries include: 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1322, 1360 (1976) and 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1976)
4. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 546 (1908).
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civil jurisdiction over Indians. 5 This grant of civil jurisdiction, however,
does not include water rights. 6
Water is a scarce resource in the West. Extraordinary competition exists
for its use. Indian lands represent a significant percentage of the total
acreage of western states. 7 The size of Indian holdings is only one aspect
of the water resource problem for western states. The expandability of
Indian claims for water rights is another aspect of the problem. Much of
the Indian land is located in places which potentially could permit control
over water rights to entire river systems. 8 Therefore, the right to assert
jurisdiction over Indian lands and the appurtenant water rights is critical
to western states. Exemption of jurisdiction over the water rights of a
significant percentage of land within a state frustrates a state's interest in
the comprehensive adjudication of water rights within its boundaries.
Most western states, including the disclaimer states, have enacted statutes which allow the state to determine water rights in a comprehensive
manner.9 To aid states in determining ownership of water rights, Congress
passed the McCarren Amendment,' ° which states that
(a) Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any
suit (1) for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river
system or other source, or (2) for the administration of such rights,
where it appears that the United States is the owner of or is in the
process of acquiring water rights by appropriation under state law,
by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and the United States is a
necessary party to such suit. The United States, when a party to any
such suit, shall (1) be deemed to have waived any right to plead that
the State laws are inapplicable or that the United States is not amenable thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and (2) shall be subject
to the judgments, orders, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction,
and may obtain review thereof, in the same manner and to the same
extent as a private individual under like circumstances provided,
That no judgment for costs shall be entered against the United States
in any such suit.
The Amendment permits states to adjudicate federal water rights appur5. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1322 (1976).
6. 25 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (1976).
7. D. GETCHES, D. ROSENFELT, & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, CASES
AND MATERIALS 14 (1976).
8. United States v. Ahtanum Irr. Dist., 236 F.2d 321, 326-327 (9th Cir. 1956).
9. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§45-102 to -106, -141 to -154, -180 to -193, -231 to -245 (1956,
and Supp. 1981); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§37-92-101 to -106 (1973, and Supp. 1980); and
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§72-1-1 to -14, and 72-7-1 to -3 (1978).
10. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1976), waives the United States' sovereign immunity in state and federal
court proceedings adjudicating water rights where it appears that the United States is the owner of
water rights or is in the process of acquiring water rights by appropriation under state law. Arizona
and Montana claim that as Trustee of Indian lands the Indians' sovereign immunity was also waived
with the United States' in disclaimer state courts.
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tenant to federal lands in state and federal courts. This waiver of federal
sovereign immunity along with the implicit waiver of Indian sovereign
immunity is of particular importance to western states, because the United
States owns approximately 46 percent of the land in the West." In Colorado River Water Conservancy District v. United States,12 (hereinafter
Akin), the Supreme Court stated that the McCarran Amendment waiver
of sovereign immunity implicitly extended to Indian lands where the
United States owned such lands.' 3
Recent Ninth Circuit holdings in San Carlos Apache Indian Tribe v.
Arizona 4 (hereinafter San Carlos)and in Northern Cheyenne Indian Tribe
of the Northern Cheyenne Reservation v. Adsit 5 (hereinafter Adsit), however, refused to extend the McCarran waiver to permit disclaimer states
to adjudicate Indian water rights. The refusal of the Ninth Circuit to
extend the McCarran Amendment to include disclaimer states frustrates
states which are trying to determine water rights within their borders,
although this was the impetus for passing the McCarran Amendment. The
McCarran Amendment's effect on disclaimer states' jurisdiction over Indian lands is the focus of this note.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Western water law is based on two doctrines: prior appropriation and
implied reservation. The doctrine of prior appropriation is a use-based
doctrine for acquiring water rights. The doctrine of implied reservation
is a need-based doctrine employed by the federal government to reserve
water rights for federal lands. The doctrines differ in the way water rights
are acquired and in the quantity of water attached to the rights.
Doctrine of PriorAppropriation
The doctrine of prior appropriation grew out of local mining customs
and laws which were based on necessity and practicality.' 6 Most, if not
all, of the western states have adopted the doctrine as a basis for deter11. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 699 n. 3 (1978).
12. Colorado River Water Conservancy Dist. v. United States (Akin), 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
13. Id. at 811.
14. 668 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3217 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1982) (No.
81-2188).
15. 668 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3218 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1982) (No.
81-2188). San Carlos and Adsit claimed federal district court jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1362 which provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions,
brought by any Indian tribe or band with a governing body duly recognized by the Secretary of the
Interior, wherein the matter in controversy arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States."
16. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882).

258

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 23

mining and allocating water rights.' 7 To obtain water rights under the
doctrine, an appropriator must make a physical diversion of a water
resource, make some beneficial use of the diversion, provide notice of
the use, and continuously apply the water to this beneficial use. In times
of scarcity, appropriators who were first in time to perfect the right have
priority over users with later claims; senior rights are protected over junior
rights. Perfected water rights are transferable, and if a person owning
water rights fails to use the water or fails to use it beneficially, his rights
are subject to forfeiture.
Doctrine of Implied Reservation
The federal government recognizes the doctrine of prior appropriation.I 8 However, the courts have also enforced federal water rights based
on implied reservations made by Congress. 9 This doctrine conflicts with
prior appropriation, and the conflict has led to voluminous litigation over
what rights the government has acquired when reserving federal land.20
The Supreme Court has held that when Congress or the executive
branch sets aside land for a federal purpose, there is an implied reservation
of sufficient water rights to support the purpose of the federal enclave. 2'
In Winters v. United States,22 the Supreme Court decided that when Congress established the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation, it retained water
rights sufficient to meet the needs of the reservation.2 3 The Winters Court
also held that the date of priority of the reserved rights impliedly coincided
with the date of the establishment of the reservation. For some time after
the Winters decision most observers thought that the doctrine of implied
reservation applied only to Indian reserved lands. In 1955, the Supreme
Court discarded this assumption in Federal Power Commission v. Oregon.24 The Court found the doctrine applied to other reserved federal
enclaves such as wildlife refuges, national recreation areas, and national
forests. It is now a settled rule that all reserved federal land carries with
17. For a general discussion and history of the doctrine, see Note, New Mexico's National Forests
and Implied Reservations Doctrine, 16 NAT. RES. J. 975, 976 (1976), and Palma, Indian Water
Rights: A State PerspectiveAfter Akin, 57 NEB. L. REV. 295, 296-298 (1978).
18. See, e.g., Mining Act of 1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251 (1866), and Desert Land Act of 1877,
ch. 107, 19 Stat.
377 (1877).
19. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 546 (1908). In Winters, the Supreme Court decided
that Indian reservations had an implied reservation of water rights, which related back to the
establishment of the reservation. See also United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978),
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 207 U.S. at 577.
23. "It was the policy of the government, it was the desire of the Indians, to change those habits
and to become a pastoral and civilized people." Id. at 576.
24. 349 U.S. 435, 448 (1955); see also Note, New Mexico's National Forests and the Implied
Reservation Doctrine, 16 NAT. RES. J. 975, 976 (1976).
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it an implied reservation of water to fulfill the primary purpose of the
reservation.25
The purpose of the reservation and the needs of the Indians determine
the quantity of Indian water rights reserved under the federal doctrine of
implied reservations. Arizona v. California measured those needs by the
"practicably irrigable" acreage test.26 Indians seeking the adjudication of
water rights generally prefer that federal courts determine the quantity of
water impliedly reserved. They fear that Indian tribes will not receive as
fair a trial in state courts because of the combative history of state-Indian
relations. Adjudicating Indian water rights in federal court presents a
problem. Often states are simultaneously adjudicating water rights of all
other claimants; yet, disclaimer clauses preempt state courts from obtaining jurisdiction over Indian claimants. The goal of comprehensively
adjudicating water rights is therefore frustrated by the fact that adjudication must occur in two forums. States are forced to intervene in federal
cases in order to adjudicate the rights of all parties in a single forum.
Until 1953, states could not sue the United States in any forum to determine United States water rights within their boundaries, and, consequently, water rights adjudication was fragmented.
THE McCARRAN AMENDMENT
Congress passed the McCarran Amendment in 1953 to avoid those28
forum problems.27 Before the passage of the McCarran Amendment,
the United States could not be sued in any forum for the adjudication of
water rights because of its sovereign immunity. This situation caused
problems for western states trying to adjudicate water rights comprehensively in state courts. Under the McCarran Amendment, states can sue
the federal government when adjudicating water rights in state courts.
By waiving the United States' sovereign immunity and implicitly waiving
Indian sovereign immunity in water rights adjudication, Congress sought
to end piecemeal adjudication of federal water rights.2 9
The McCarran Amendment does not mention Indian lands and Indian
water rights as being subject to state court adjudication, but Akin held
25. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978), Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546
(1963), and United States v. District Court in and for the County of Eagle, 401 U.S. 520, 523
(1971), where the court stated that the nature of the federal enclave will determine the amount of
water to be reserved under the doctrine of implied reservation. When deciding the amount of water
reserved, the courts must look to the purpose of the enclave.
26. 373 U.S. at 600.
27. 43 U.S.C. §666, supra note 10.
28. Id.
29. See Akin, 424 U.S. at 819.
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that Congress intended the Amendment to apply to Indian lands.3 ° The
Court held the Amendment applied to Indians because Congress rejected
a specific recommendation that the McCarran Amendment apply only to
non-Indian rights. 3' The Akin Court, however, did not decide whether the
McCarran Amendment overrules or repeals the disclaimer provisions in
enabling acts or state constitutions.
The Akin Interpretation of the McCarranAmendment
The United States, plaintiff in Akin, filed suit in federal district court
seeking the adjudication and determination of United States, Indian, and
state water rights within a river system in Colorado. The defendants
moved for a dismissal, arguing that Colorado state courts were adjudicating those rights pursuant to the McCarran Amendment. The district
court dismissed the case on the grounds that the doctrine of abstention
required the court to defer to a prior pending state proceeding on the
same issue. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding the suit to be
within the federal court's jurisdiction; hence, abstention was inappropriate. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the
McCarran Amendment terminated federal court jurisdiction to adjudicate
federal water rights.
The Supreme Court held the McCarran Amendment did not terminate
jurisdiction in the federal courts, but was a grant of concurrent jurisdiction
to the state courts over the federal government for purposes of adjudicating
federal water rights. The Court further held that the dismissal was improper under the doctrine of abstention. Nevertheless, the Court upheld
the dismissal on the basis of the doctrine of wise judicial administration.
The Court found the dismissal warranted because it furthered the congressional policy of the amendment, by encouraging comprehensive adjudication of water rights and by furthering Congress' preference for state
court determination of water rights.32 The Court also listed several other
''exceptional circumstances" as grounds for dismissal under the doctrine
of wise judicial administration: (1) the apparent absence of any proceedings in the federal district court; (2) the extensive involvement in the state
court proceedings; (3) forum non-conveniens; and (4) the participation
33
of the federal government in other state court water rights cases.
Akin did not reach the issue of whether the McCarran Amendment
repealed or amended disclaimer clauses in enabling acts because Colorado
has no disclaimer clause in its constitution. Although neither Congress
30. 424 U.S. at 811. The Court stated that the "legislative history demonstrates that the McCarran
Amendment is to be construed as reaching federal water rights reserved on behalf of Indians."
31. Id. at 812 n. 18. citing Hearings on S. 18 before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, 82d Cong., 1st Sess, at 6-7, 67-68 (1951).
32. Id. at 810-811.
33. Id. at 820.

January 1983]

INDIAN WATER RIGHTS

nor the Supreme Court in Akin considered the McCarran Amendment's
effect on disclaimer clauses, the Tenth Circuit in JicarillaApache Tribe
v. United States34 held that, under Akin, the federal district court in New
Mexico properly dismissed the Tribe's water case in favor of the state
proceedings.35 The Supreme Court in Akin, however, specifically reserved
the question of whether a federal district court could dismiss a water
rights case brought by a private party in favor of a state proceeding.36
Uncertainty exists whether the Akin Court would have sanctioned the
dismissal of an Indian water rights case in federal district court, especially
in a disclaimer state such as New Mexico. 37 The Supreme Court's interpretation of McCarran in Akin is therefore inappropriate when a disclaimer
state seeks to adjudicate Indian water rights.
In San Carlos and Adsit, however, the Ninth Circuit squarely addressed
whether the McCarran Amendment repealed the disclaimer provisions of
the enabling acts and constitutions. The federal district courts should have
decided this issue before dismissing the cases under the doctrine of wise
judicial administration, because "dismissal [under any doctrine] clearly
would have been inappropriate if the state court had no jurisdiction to
decide those claims." 38 The disclaimer provisions forbid the exercise of
state court jurisdiction over Indian lands, while McCarran purports to
allow it without specifically repealing those statutes. When such a situation arises, the rule enunciated in Akin is as follows: "In the absence
of some affirmative showing of an intention to repeal, the only permissible
justification for a repeal by implication is when the earlier and later statutes
are irreconcilable. " 39 Hence, before deciding whether the Akin "exceptional circumstances" were present to warrant the dismissal under the
34. 601 F.2d 1116, 1131 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979).
35. Id. The Jicarilla Apache Court relied on the State of New Mexico's argument that the
adjudication of Indian water rights was a non-propriety interest and therefore allowed under Organized
Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962). But the JicarillaApache court failed to discuss the
fact that no where has Kake been interpreted to apply to Indian water rights. Kake dealt with nonIndian fishing rights. Cf, McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 176 n. 15 (1973).
The Court there relegated Kake to apply to non-reservation Indians. The State of Alaska was allowed
to "regulate" disclaimer property but not to exercise a proprietary interest over Indian property. The
JicarillaApache court went on to rely on United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978), to
support their view that the McCarran Amendment was a specific grant of jurisdiction by Congress
to regulate Indian tribes. No Supreme Court case, however, has held that the adjudication of Indian
water rights is a regulatory power.
36. 424 U.S. at 820 n. 26.
37. Under Akin, nondisclaimer state courts clearly have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts
to determine Indian water fights. The dismissal was affirmed because an alternate forum was available
to decide the issues. When Indian tribes bring suit in federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1362, particularly in disclaimer states, it is not clear whether the federal courts could dismiss such
an action. The Akin court reserved the issue whether a federal district court could dismiss a suit
brought by a private party.
38. 424 U.S. at 809.
39. Id. at.
808, citing Morton v. Mancari, 41.7
U.S. 535, 550 (197_4).
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doctrine of wise judicial administration, it must be decided whether the
McCarran Amendment repealed the disclaimer provisions "by implication."
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In San Carlos, four federally recognized Indian tribes with reservations
located in Arizona filed suit in federal district court against Arizona to
force the adjudication of water rights from several water systems. The
suits were consolidated and dismissed in favor of a pending state court
proceeding adjudicating water rights on the water systems under Arizona
law. Similarly, in Adsit, a federally recognized Indian tribe in Montana
and the United States government, on behalf of several other tribes, filed
suit in federal district court against numerous defendants and the State
of Montana to force adjudication of water rights. The district court stayed
the Adsit proceedings pending determination of Akin by the United States
Supreme Court. After the Akin decision extended the McCarran Amendment waiver of sovereign immunity to Indian lands, the district court in
Adsit dismissed the plaintiff's petition for water rights adjudication as an
exercise of "wise judicial administration." 40
Until the Akin decision, Indian water rights had not been adjudicated
in state courts. The Court in Akin held the McCarran Amendment applicable to Indian lands as well as other federal reserved lands.4" Hence,
after Akin, the quantity of reserved Indian water rights was also subject
to state court determination. In San Carlos and Adsit, the district courts
found jurisdiction, but dismissed the Indian suits under the doctrine of
wise judicial administration as announced in Akin.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit confronted the same issues in both San
Carlos and Adsit. They were as follows: (1) whether a state with a
disclaimer provision in its enabling act and in its constitution has jurisdiction over Indian water rights under the McCarran Amendment; and
(2) whether the district courts properly dismissed the Indian tribes' cases
under the doctrine of wise judicial administration. Although the Arizona
and Montana enabling acts and constitutions have disclaimer provisions
prohibiting them from asserting jurisdiction over Indian lands, both states
argued on appeal that the McCarran Amendment grants their state courts
jurisdiction over Indian water rights.
40. The doctrine of wise judicial administration is a theory developed to conserve judicial resources
and to provide for the most efficient use of judicial resources. When two courts have concurrent
jurisdiction over a cause of action, the theory dictates that the court which can best decide the issues
be allowed to hear the case. One court defers to the other "giving regard to conservation of judicial
resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation ..
" Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-TWO Fire
Equipment Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952) and see Akin, 424 U.S. at 817.
41. 424 U.S. at 811.
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In San Carlos and Adsit, the Ninth Circuit held that the McCarran
Amendment did not repeal the disclaimer provisions in the Arizona or
Montana enabling acts or constitutions.42 Consequently, Arizona and
Montana state courts do not have jurisdiction over Indian water rights.
The Ninth Circuit remanded the cases to the district courts for determination of whether the disclaimer state obtained jurisdiction over the Indian
tribes pursuant to Public Law 280. 43 The Ninth Circuit further held that
San Carlos and Adsit lacked the "exceptional circumstances" which 44warranted dismissal under the doctrine of wise judicial administration.
ANALYSIS OF SAN CARLOS AND ADSIT
When Congress conducted hearings on the effect of the McCarran
Amendment, it considered the Amendment's effect on Indian tribes only
one time .4 1 During hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee, the
Justice Department and the Department of Interior suggested the Amendment be inapplicable to Indian water rights. This suggestion was rejected
and never incorporated into the final language of the bill. Furthermore,
the McCarran Amendment's legislative history makes no mention of the
disclaimer language of the enabling acts.
42. San Carlos, 668 F.2d at 1097 and Adsit, 668 F.2d at 1087.
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1976) and 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1976). This law grants jurisdiction to the
"States of California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin with respect to criminal offenses
and civil causes of action committed or arising on Indian reservations within such States." Any state
wishing to assume jurisdiction over Indians could do so "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of any
Enabling Act for the admission of the state," by amending their "constitutions or statutes as the
case may be." This Act was passed approximately one year and one month after the McCarran
Amendment. It goes to demonstrate that Congress was aware of the disclaimer provisions and
explicitly sought to repeal them for purposes of conferring jurisdiction on the State courts. This
provision for overriding the enabling acts and constitutions was not, however, inserted in the McCarran
Amendment. Public Law 280, however, did not "authorize the alleviation, encumbrance, or taxation
of any real or personal property, including water rights, belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe.
. . ." (emphasis supplied.) 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (1976). This language is the same as that used in
18 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (1976). Essentially this means that no state would have jurisdiction to determine
Indian water rights absent a specific grant of jurisdiction such as the McCarran Amendment. Public
Law 280 is inapposite to San Carlos and Adsit. Disclaimer states, on the other hand, would have
no jurisdiction whatsoever either under the McCarran Amendment or these acts.
44. San Carlos, 668 F.2d at 1098 and Adsit, 668 F.2d at 1087. In Akin, the Supreme Court
affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case in favor of the state court proceeding. The court
cited the following factors as the basis for its decision under the doctrine of wise judicial administration:
Beyond the congressional policy expressed by the McCarran Amendment and consistent with furtherance of that policy, we also find significant (a) the apparent absence
of any proceedings in the District Court, other than the filing of the complaint, prior
to the motion to dismiss, (b) the extensive involvement of state water rights occasioned
by this suit naming 1,000 defendants, (c) the 300-mile distance between the District
Court in Denver and the court in Division 7, and (d) the existing participation by the
Government in Division 4, 5 and 6 proceedings.
424 U.S. at 820.
45. See supra note 31.
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Prior to the Tenth Circuit's ruling in Jicarilla,no case law existed on
the McCarran Amendment's effect on Indian water rights. Akin itself
never mentioned the McCarran Amendment's effect on disclaimer provisions. The Akin Court held only that the McCarran Amendment clearly
granted jurisdiction to states over Indian tribes, predicating their decision
on the congressional rejection of the earlier discussed proposal by the
Departments of Interior and Justice. The Jicarillacourt followed the Akin
decision, but went further in stating that "subject matter jurisdiction
should be recognized as allowable in the state courts of the general water
rights adjudication proceeding, there being implicit modification of the
Enabling Act to that extent, as necessary." 4 6
The McCarran Amendment conflicts with the disclaimer provisions of
11 states. On the one hand, the disclaimer provisions prohibit those 11
states from asserting jurisdiction over Indian lands. On the other hand,
the McCarran Amendment purports to waive federal and tribal sovereign
immunity and to grant all states jurisdiction over all federal lands for
purposes of adjudicating water rights, which should include Indian lands.
As previously indicated, the conflict exists because the McCarran Amendment fails to explicitly repeal the disclaimer provision of the enabling
acts.
When there are conflicts between statutes, a specific statute controls
over a general statute.47 The enabling acts are specific statutes granting
statehood upon definite conditions. In view of this fact, and the fact that
the McCarran Amendment's legislative history did not address the issue
of the disclaimer provisions in the enabling acts, the general rule of
construction requires that the enabling acts should control. The specific
terms of enabling acts, that is, the disclaimer provisions, should prevail
over the general terms of the McCarran Amendment, which otherwise
would be controlling.48 McCarran cannot have the effect of repealing or
abrogating the enabling act disclaimer provisions in light of the "cardinal
rule ...that repeals by implication are not favored." 49
A repeal by implication is only acceptable when the earlier and later
statutes are irreconcilable." The enabling acts and the McCarran Amendment, however, are not irreconcilable. The enabling acts can be read as
prohibiting the assertion of state court jurisdiction over Indian lands even
after the McCarran Amendment. The McCarran Amendment can be viewed
46. 601 F.2d at 1131.
47. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 550-551.
48. Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prod. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 228-229 (1957).
49. Posadas, Collector of Internal Revenue v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936) see
also Ginsberg & Sons v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 (1932) stating that "[sIpecific terms prevail
over the general in the same or another statute which otherwise might be controlling."
50. Posada, 296 U.S. at 503.
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as granting jurisdiction to all states over the United States in all state and
federal court cases adjudicating federal water rights. In view of the enabling acts, the McCarran Amendment grant of jurisdiction to disclaimer
states is limited. Disclaimer state courts only have jurisdiction over all
federal non-Indian lands in water rights cases. Non-disclaimer states under
the McCarran Amendment have jurisdiction over all federal lands, both
Indian and non-Indian, in water rights cases. The United States' and tribal
sovereign immunity is waived in disclaimer states only in federal district
court cases where Indian water rights are concerned. Therefore, the statutes are reconcilable. The McCarran Amendment should be read as not
repealing the disclaimer provisions since the legislative history sheds no
light on whether Congress intended to repeal the disclaimer provisions
and since there is no explicit repeal. When the two laws are read together,
the federal courts still have exclusive jurisdiction over Indian water rights
in disclaimer states.
In addition, under 28 U.S.C. § 1362,1 the dismissal of an Indian case
under the doctrine of wise judicial administration is inappropriate, especially if the McCarran Amendment is read as not granting disclaimer
states jurisdiction over Indian water rights cases. 5 2 The doctrine of wise
judicial administration as applied in Akin presumed an alternate forum
for litigation of the issues. The dismissal of Indian cases in favor of state
court proceedings which do not have jurisdiction to hear Indian water
rights cases would be a misapplication of the doctrine, at least as Akin
intended it to apply.53 Dismissal under those circumstances is a clear
abrogation of the federal court's duty to exercise jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1362. 54
Furthermore, even if it is conceded that the McCarran Amendment
implicitly repealed the disclaimer provisions in enabling acts, the Amend51. 28 U.S.C. § 1362 provides that "[tihe district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions brought by any Indian tribe . . . wherein the matter in controversy arises under the
Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States."
52. The policy behind § 1362 was as follows: (1) federal courts traditionally had jurisdiction over
Indian lands; (2) the class of cases arising under federal law are best determined by federal courts;
(3) Indian fears of adjudicating their claims in hostile state courts; and (4) federal courts have more
expertise to decide federal questions. H.R. REP. NO. 2040 at 2, 1966 USCC & Ann. at 3146, and
S. REP. NO. 1057, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1966). Indians have generally feared state authority
over them, and this fear clearly manifests itself in the congressional policy behind this act. Moreover,
where a federal court is granted original jurisdiction by an act such as § 1362, it has "the duty...
to adjudicate a controversy properly before it." Akin, 424 U.S. at 813, citing County of Allegheny
v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-189 (1959). When an Indian tribe brings a suit in a
federal district court of a disclaimer state, it stands to reason that the court has "the virtually
unflagging obligation" to exercise jurisdiction. Akin, 424 U.S. at 817, citing England v. Medical
Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415 (1964). Under these circumstances, the federal district court improperly dismissed San Carlos and Adsit under the doctrine of wise judicial administration.
53. 424 U.S. at 809.

54. See England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 441, 415 (1964).
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ment nowhere provides for the amending of state constitutional provisions
prohibiting assumption of jurisdiction over Indian lands. Disclaimer states
still have no authority to assume jurisdiction over Indian lands absent an
amendment to their state constitutions. Disclaimer states have a double
hurdle to overcome prior to their assuming jurisdiction over Indian lands.
Their enabling acts must be amended as well as their constitutions. Unless
both these steps are taken, they lack authority to assume jurisdiction over
Indian water rights.
CONCLUSION
Absent an explicit congressional act such as Public Law 280,11 granting
jurisdiction over Indian water rights to disclaimer states, those states
cannot be given jurisdiction over Indian water rights under the McCarran
Amendment.56 Federal courts do not have the power to confer jurisdiction
over Indian water rights on disclaimer state courts.5 7 Congress must explicitly repeal the enabling acts' disclaimer provisions to make the McCarran
Amendment applicable to disclaimer states. The legislative history of
McCarran's effect on disclaimer provisions does not show a "clear and
manifest" legislative intention to repeal the provisions as required by case
law. 8 As the Ninth Circuit in San Carlos and Adsit reads the enabling
acts of disclaimer states and the McCarran Amendment, there is no conflict
between the statutes and hence, no implicit repeal. In light of the disclaimer provisions of the enabling acts, the McCarran Amendment can
only be read as a grant of jurisdiction to state courts in two situations:
(1) the McCarran Amendment grants full concurrent jurisdiction for adjudication of federal water rights to nondisclaimer states over federal
enclaves with Indian and non-Indian purposes, 59 and (2) the McCarran
Amendment grants concurrent jurisdiction for adjudication of federal water
rights to disclaimer states only to the extent Indian lands are not being
considered. Therefore, disclaimer states do not have concurrent jurisdiction with federal district courts over Indian water rights, absent an explicit
modification, by Congress, of their enabling acts and an amendment to
their state constitutions.
55. Pub. L. No. 83-280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (1953).
56. See generally Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 490 (1979), discussing
Congress' explicit intention to provide disclaimer states with jurisdiction over Indian lands. The
Court's discussion makes it clear that Congress intended disclaimer states to have jurisdiction over
Indians under Public Law 280. Congress even provided a method for states to overcome constitutional
and statutory barriers. The Court also discussed the legislative history of Public Law 280 which
demonstrates that Congress was aware of the disclaimer problem.
57. See Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137, 174 (1804) and Hunter v. Martin's Lessee, I Wheat.
304, 388 (1816) stating that "[ilt
is the case, then, and not the court, that gives jurisdiction."
58. Posada, 296 U.S. at 503; Morton, 417 U.S. at 549-550; and Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad
Co., 324 U.S. 439, 456-457 (1945).
59. Akin, 424 U.S. at 809.
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Notwithstanding the Tenth Circuit's holding in Jicarilla,the most Akin
should be cited for, with respect to the McCarran Amendment and Indian
water rights, is that Akin held the McCarran Amendment granted Colorado, a nondisclaimer state, concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts to
adjudicate Indian water rights. The Ninth Circuit's decisions with respect
to San Carlos and Adsit were correct insofar as the court held that the
McCarran Amendment did not repeal Arizona's and Montana's enabling
acts and that the doctrine of wise judicial administration, as applied in
Akin, was inapposite.
Whether the waiver of sovereign immunity extends to Indian tribes in
disclaimer states is the issue before the Supreme Court in San Carlos and
in Adsit. An additional point on appeal is whether the district courts
properly dismissed these cases under the doctrine of wise judicial administration, as announced in Akin, in favor of pending state proceedings
determining water rights. The Supreme Court in hearing and in reviewing
the issues in these cases in light of the case law should find the specific
enabling acts controlling in the disposition of San Carlos and Adsit. The
Court's consistent holdings in Posada v. National City Bank' and Morton
v. Mancari6 make it clear that Congress must explicitly repeal the disclaimer provisions. The Court has expressly stated in numerous cases that
it does not favor repeals by implication. The McCarran Amendment
simply failed to go the full stride to accomplish Congress' purpose of
allowing state courts to adjudicate all water rights.
KURT A. SOMMER

60. 296 U.S. 204 (1936).
61. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).

